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There is a significant debate in Origenian scholarship today about the allegory/
typology distinction. Some scholars accept the demarcation between these two 
forms of nonliteral scriptural interpretation, whereas others reject it. In this 
paper I seek to determine whether, or to what extent, the allegory/typology 
distinction is valid for study of this prominent early Christian exegete. My 
article unfolds in three steps. First, I canvass the last sixty years of scholarship 
that insists upon this distinction and determine where consensus has been 
reached, as well as where disagreement still exists; next, I turn to Origen’s 
own writings and assess how he used and defined the Greek terms that stand 
behind “allegory” and “typology”; in the third section I explore if there was 
in Origen’s writings a distinction that resembled what most scholars today 
intend to invoke when they speak of allegory and typology. In my conclusion 
I contend that the literature’s allegory/typology distinction is of mixed value. 
I propose ways to salvage what is important in this distinction and dispense 
with what is problematic.
A little more than sixty years ago, J. Daniélou and H. de Lubac sparked 
a debate over allegory and typology in the early church. Was the distinc-
tion between these two forms of nonliteral scriptural interpretation valid, 
or was it not? Did “allegory” and “typology” serve as the best terms for 
marking these two sorts of nonliteral exegesis? The beginnings of this 
dispute centered principally upon the figure of Origen of Alexandria. 
J. Daniélou first proposed the allegory/typology distinction in a slew of 
publications that began in 1946,1 and despite H. de Lubac’s subsequent 
Journal of Early Christian Studies 16:3, 283–317 © 2008 The Johns Hopkins University Press
1. “Traversée de la Mer Rouge et Baptême aux premiers siècles,” Recherches de 
Science Religieuse 33 (1946): 402–30; “La typologie d’Isaac dans le christianisme 
primitif,” Biblica 28 (1947): 363–93; “Les divers sens de l’Écriture dans la tradition 
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critique,2 Daniélou introduced it prominently into Origenian studies with 
his 1948 biography, Origène.3 
Today the debate surrounding allegory and typology appears as unsettled 
in Origenian scholarship as it was sixty years ago. While several have fol-
lowed de Lubac in expressing reserve over the validity of this distinction, 
a parallel trajectory can also be plotted in the literature that has insisted, 
with J. Daniélou, that this distinction is indeed applicable to Origen. In 
this paper I will attempt to resolve the debate over allegory and typology 
as it pertains to Origen. Whether, or to what extent, is the allegory/typol-
ogy distinction valid for this prominent and influential early Christian 
exegete?
This article will unfold in three steps. In the first, I will canvass the last 
sixty years of scholarship that has insisted upon the validity of this dis-
tinction for Origen. I will attempt to clarify the status quaestionis on this 
issue—where has consensus been reached, and where does disagreement 
still exist? In the next section of this paper I will seek to clarify this persis-
tent, yet elusive, distinction on the basis of Origen’s own writings. I will 
determine whether he used and defined the Greek terms that stand behind 
“allegory” and “typology” as the literature has done. The pair éllhgor¤a 
and éllhgor°v, as well as the “typic” family of terms—tÊpow, tupikÒw, 
and tupik«w—are of importance here. In the final section I will explore 
if there was in Origen’s writings a distinction that resembled what most 
scholars today intend to invoke when they speak of Origen’s allegorical 
and typological interpretations of Scripture. 
It will be my overarching contention that the literature’s allegory/typol-
ogy distinction is of mixed value. While one facet of this distinction cer-
tainly applies to Origen, there are other facets that do not, and these 
actually do more to obscure Origen’s own language and thought than 
illuminate them. Is there a way, then, of moving the scholarly discussion 
forward that would allow us to salvage what is important in this distinc-
tion and dispense with what is problematic? And what are the implications 
chrétienne primitive,” ETL 24 (1948): 119–26; Origène (Paris: Table Ronde, 1948); 
“La Typologie de la Semaine au IVe siècle,” Recherches de Science Religieuse 35 (1948): 
382–411; “La typologie millénariste de la semaine dans le Christianisme primitif,” VC 
2 (1948): 1–16; Sacramentum futuri: Études sur les origines de la typologie biblique 
(Paris: Beauchesne, 1950); “Qu’est-ce que la typologie?” in L’Ancien Testament et les 
chrétiens, ed. P. Auvray, et al. (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1951): 199–205.
2. In particular, cf. H. de Lubac, “‘Typologie’ et ‘Allégorisme,’” in Recherches de 
Science Religieuse 34 (1947): 180–226.
3. See esp. the two chapters in Origène entitled “The Typological Interpretation of 
the Bible” and “The Non-Christian Traditions of Exegesis” (on allegory).
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of this analysis of Origen for other biblical interpreters in early Christi-
anity? There is certainly considerable disagreement over the validity of 
the allegory/typology distinction for the field of early Christian biblical 
interpretation as a whole.4 
SURVEY: A HISTORY OF THE ALLEGORY/TYPOLOGY 
DISTINCTION IN ORIGENIAN SCHOLARSHIP
The distinction between the allegorical and typological moments in Ori-
gen’s exegetical enterprise is most commonly associated with an influential 
4. The consensus favors this distinction. Three important introductions to biblical 
interpretation in early Christianity appeal to it: M. Simonetti, Biblical Interpretation 
in the Early Church: An Historical Introduction to Patristic Exegesis, trans. J. A. 
Hughes (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1994), 69; F. M. Young, Biblical Exegesis and 
the Formation of Christian Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 
152–57, 161, 186; J. J. O’Keefe and R. R. Reno, Sanctified Vision: An Introduction 
to Early Christian Interpretation of the Bible (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity Press, 2005), esp. ch. 4 (“Typological Interpretation”) and ch. 5 (“Allegorical 
Interpretation”). A representative sampling of recent reference works on early Chris-
tianity also indicates a clear preference for a distinction between these two ways of 
reading—cf. M. Simonetti, “Allegory-Typology,” in Encyclopedia of the Early Church, 
ed. A. Di Berardino, trans. A. Walford (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); 
J. E. Alsup, “Typology,” in Anchor Bible Dictionary, ed. D. N. Freedman, et al., vol. 
6 (New York: Doubleday, 1992); W. A. Bienert, “Allegorie/Allegorese: IV: Kirchen-
geschichtlich,” in Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, ed. H. D. Betz, et al., 4th 
ed., vol. 1 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998); S. G. Hall, “Typologie,” in Theologische 
Realenzyklopädie, vol. 34 (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 2002); “Allegory” and “Typology” 
in D. E. Aune, The Westminster Dictionary of New Testament and Early Christian 
Literature and Rhetoric (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2003).
There are, however, some articles that deny this distinction—cf. J. Trigg, “Allegory,” 
in EEC, ed. E. Ferguson, 2nd ed., vol. 1 (New York: Garland, 1997) and note that 
there is no article on “typology” in this work. It is certainly remarkable how The 
Oxford Companion to Christian Thought, ed. A. Hastings, et al. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000) has entries both for “allegory” (G. Ward) and “typology” (A. 
Louth), though the author of the latter denies the applicability of the distinction to 
patristic biblical interpretation. E. A. Clark’s Reading Renunciation: Asceticism and 
Scripture in Early Christianity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 73–78, 
also denies it.
Finally, some of the scholarship occupies middle ground. Some concede difficulty 
in making the distinction—e.g., C. Kannengiesser, in Handbook of Patristic Exegesis: 
The Bible in Ancient Christianity, vol. 1 (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 226, 238–42, 251–55. 
Others accept its validity, but nevertheless express some degree of skepticism as to 
its applicability to the early church—cf. K. Pollmann, “Typologie,” in DNP: Enzyk-
lopädie der Antike, ed. H. Cancik, et al., vol. 12/1 (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler: 2001); 
R. Suntrump, Der Neue Pauly: Enzyklopädie der Antike: Rezeptions- und Wissen-
schaftsgeschichte, ed. H. Cancik, et al., vol. 15/3 (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler: 2003).
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and prolific scholar of early Christianity, J. Daniélou.5 In a little-known 
publication from 1951, “Qu’est-ce que la typologie?,”6 he offered a crisp 
summary of his own views on this subject.
The object of typology is the research of the correspondences between the 
events, the institutions, and the persons of the Old Testament and those of 
the New Testament, which is inaugurated by the coming of Christ and will 
be consummated with his parousia.7 
What is figured by the OT has many aspects, but these find their unity 
in Christ. Thus, with different aspects of Christ come different sorts of 
typology—there is christological typology, ecclesiastical typology, mysti-
cal typology, and eschatological typology, corresponding to Christ in his 
historical existence, Christ in his life in the church, in his union with the 
soul, and his parousia. While typological exegesis was already evident 
within the OT itself, in the NT it received a decisive new emphasis: the 
realization of the OT in Jesus Christ who was the new Adam, the true 
Noah, second Moses, etc. Daniélou envisioned two forms of typology in 
the NT. The Matthean, which had an influence both in the West and in 
Jerusalem, saw events in the OT as types of historical events in Jesus’ life 
(e.g., Rachel weeping for her lost children figured Herod’s massacre of the 
infants [Matt 2.16–18]). This sort of typology Origen rejected in favor of 
the Johannine, which saw in the events of the OT not figures of “circum-
stances” in Jesus’ life, but of the “mysteries” in that life (e.g., the serpent 
in the wilderness was a figure of the mystery of salvation [Jn 3.14–15]).8 
Whether of Matthean or Johannine extraction, typology was “a part of 
the common tradition of the church”9—i.e., it could be seen throughout 
the early church, in the West and East, in Antioch and Alexandria, and 
was the sort of exegesis that should still be normative for Christian bibli-
cal scholars in Daniélou’s day.
But this was not the whole story. In the intellectual milieu in which 
patristic exegesis developed there were two other currents of OT inter-
5. He was not, however, the first to introduce this distinction into early Christian 
studies. For example, cf. L. Goppelt, Typos: The Typological Interpretation of the Old 
Testament in the New, trans. D. H. Madvig (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1982), 
5–6 (ET of Die typologische Deutung des Alten Testaments im Neuen [Gütersloh: 
C. Bertelsmann, 1939]), and C. Spicq, Esquisse d’une histoire de l’exégèse latine au 
moyen âge (Paris: J. Vrin, 1944), 22. 
6. See n. 1 above for the bibliographical details.
7. Daniélou, “Qu’est-ce que la typologie?,” 199. 
8. Daniélou, “Typologie?,” 200–202.
9. Daniélou, “Typologie?,” 203.
MARTENS/REVISITING ALLEGORY AND TYPOLOGY   287
pretation that exerted a foreign influence on the fathers: the rabbinic and 
the Philonic. These influences were responsible for the distinguishing and 
dubious features of the different schools’ readings of Scripture; Origen and 
the Alexandrian school fell under Philo’s spell, whereas the Antiochenes 
were adversely beholden to rabbinic exegesis. According to Daniélou, 
while Philo’s exegesis was complex, it was, nevertheless, strongly allegori-
cal in its search for the symbolic signification (“signification symbolique”) 
of the text. Philo’s allegory was characterized by three features: first, the 
details of the biblical text had a symbolic sense only accessible to those 
with insight; second, the realities of Jewish history were an image either 
of the cosmos, or of the soul, or of the intelligible world; and finally, Philo 
utilized a symbolism borrowed from Hellenistic culture for interpreting 
the OT. On these points allegory conflicted with biblical typology; allegory 
was concerned more with wording and word plays than with the realities 
or events of which words spoke, and was also not interested in the right 
sort of nonliteral referents, eschewing Christology for cosmology, psychol-
ogy, etc.10 Philo’s influence was detected in Clement of Alexandria, Ori-
gen, and Ambrose, to cite only the main figures, and it would become the 
characteristic trait of the Alexandrian school’s exegesis. Daniélou wished 
to emphasize, however, that these were only the idiosyncratic features of 
Alexandrian exegesis and that it still shared with other schools and exe-
getes, the “la tradition typologique commune.”11
Daniélou’s narrative elicited an immediate response. A year after he had 
first proposed his thesis, H. de Lubac (1947) offered a polite response, 
contending that Daniélou’s lexicon was at odds with the patristic one. 
[Daniélou’s distinction between typology and allegory] has, nevertheless, 
the disadvantage, we think, of being formulated with a terminology that is 
neither scriptural nor truly traditional. Thus it risks, perhaps, muddling up 
in certain minds, rather than clarifying as it proposes to do, the historical 
problem relating to this [spiritual] exegesis.”12 
It was the confusion surrounding “allegory” that de Lubac had especially 
in mind. Paul had, after all, already used this term (Gal 4.24) and innu-
merable biblical interpreters of the early and medieval periods, Origen 
included, not only followed Paul in speaking of “allegory,” but had even 
patterned their own allegorical interpretations off of Paul’s—quite simply, 
10. Daniélou, “Typologie?,” 203–4.
11. Daniélou, “Typologie?,” 205.
12. H. de Lubac, “‘Typologie’ et ‘Allégorisme,’” in Recherches de Science Reli-
gieuse 34 (1947): 180–81.
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“allegory” in patristic and medieval exegesis was usually not understood 
as a foreign and deficient intrusion (Philonic) to Christianity as Daniélou 
was now casting it.13 So when Daniélou defined patristic “typology” as 
nonliteral exegesis native to Christian soil, and opposed it to “allegory,” 
now defined as an impoverished form of nonliteral exegesis foreign to 
Christianity, how was this not misleading, de Lubac wondered, when for 
the ancients “allegorical exegesis” was laudable and legitimately Pauline?14 
Several scholars have accepted de Lubac’s conclusions.15 
Not a year passed before Daniélou took the opportunity to respond to 
de Lubac. Making short mention of this critical article in the footnotes to 
his biography on Origen (1948), Daniélou wrote:
As Fr. de Lubac very properly observes, it is only recently that these two 
terms have been used as opposites. It is, however, convenient to use them in 
that sense. The main thing, after all, is to make the distinction between the 
two things quite clear—which Fr. de Lubac does not, perhaps, altogether 
succeed in doing.16
The “two things” that had to be clearly distinguished, for Daniélou, were 
the successful and the unsuccessful nonliteral interpretations of Scripture, 
“typology” and “allegory” respectively. This concern would prove por-
tentous. Over the course of the next half-century, a dominant trajectory 
of the scholarship would insist, with him, that “typology” and “allegory” 
ought indeed to serve as markers for the better and worse forms of nonlit-
eral exegesis. This pattern will become evident in the survey of the litera-
ture that now follows; it will also become clear, however, that this same 
literature has chosen to define success and failure in the realm of Origen’s 
nonliteral exegesis in remarkably different ways. 
In 1959, R. P. C. Hanson published Allegory and Event, to this day the 
13. H. de Lubac, “‘Typologie’ et ‘Allégorisme,’” 181–200 (on Origen, cf. esp. 
197–200). The Antiochenes, of course, formed the exception to this rule, though de 
Lubac insists that they were simply wrong in their critique of Alexandrian allegory 
for denying the historical reality of the events recorded in Scripture (200–201).
14. H. de Lubac, “‘Typologie’ et ‘Allégorisme,’” 200. The same distinction was 
criticized in his later article, “Sens spirituel,” Recherches de Science Religieuse 36 
(1949): 542–76. 
15. Cf. esp. R. Gögler, Zur Theologie des Biblischen Wortes bei Origenes (Düssel-
dorf: Patmos, 1963), 98–105, 359–62; H. Crouzel, “La distinction de la ‘typologie’ 
et de l’ ‘allégorie,’” in Bulletin de Littérature Ecclésiastique 65 (1964): 161–74. Also 
cf. A. Louth, Discerning the Mystery: An Essay on the Nature of Theology (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1983), 118–19, and E. A. Clark, Reading Renunciation, 73–78.
16. Quoting from the ET (Origen [New York: Sheed and Ward, 1955]: 327, n. 2). 
J. Daniélou, Origène (Paris: La Table Ronde, 1948), 175 n. 1. 
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most comprehensive English work on Origen’s exegesis. Hanson opened 
his book with a set of definitions strongly influenced by the earlier work 
of G. W. H. Lampe and K. J. Woollcombe:17 
Typology is the interpreting of an event belonging to the present or the 
recent past as the fulfillment of a similar situation recorded or prophesied in 
Scripture. Allegory is the interpretation of an object or person or a number 
of objects or persons as in reality meaning some object or person of a later 
time, with no attempt made to trace a relationship of “similar situation” 
between them.18 
There are two points of interest in this definition. First, Hanson, like 
Daniélou before him, invested these definitions with polemical over-
tones—typology was an acceptable sort of nonliteral exegesis and allegory 
was not, with its roots in the Hellenistic world.19 But unlike Daniélou, 
Hanson contended that the fundamental distinction hinged upon “similar 
situation” (and not on a distinction between texts and events, or between 
the christological or non-christological character of the nonliteral refer-
ent). For Hanson, typology was successful because it discerned legitimate 
correspondences between two sets of events, whereas allegory was the 
name given to arbitrary nonliteral exercises in which no convincing link 
was discovered between the original event and its nonliteral referent. The 
“and” in the title, Allegory and Event, means something like “opposed 
to,” “against,” or “obscures.”
In 1972, W. A. Bienert once again applied this distinction to Origen in his 
“Allegoria” und “Anagoge” bei Didymos dem Blinden von Alexandria.20 
Bienert insisted that there were two distinct forms of nonliteral interpre-
tation in the early church, but that the ancients, Origen included, did not 
17. Cf. G. W. H. Lampe, “The Reasonableness of Typology” and K. J. Woollcombe, 
“The Biblical Origins and Patristic Development of Typology,” in Essays on Typology 
(Naperville, IL: A. R. Allenson, 1957): 29, 39–40, 65, 70.
18. R. P. C. Hanson, Allegory and Event: A Study of the Sources and Significance of 
Origen’s Interpretation of Scripture (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1959; reprint, with 
an introduction by J. W. Trigg: Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2002), 7. 
19. Hanson thought that there were two distinct sorts of allegory in antiquity, 
Hellenistic and Palestinian. The former “knows nothing of typology” whereas the 
latter “is full of typology” (Allegory and Event, 63–64). When speaking of Palestin-
ian allegory and its influence on early Christianity, Hanson could sometimes speak 
of typology and allegory synonymously (36). However, for Hanson, Origen’s allegory 
(i.e., Alexandrian allegory) was derived from Hellenistic and not Palestinian allegory, 
and so the “allegory” Hanson is referring to in this definition at the start of his work 
is the Hellenistic/Alexandrian/Origenian variety (63–64, 125–26).
20. W. A. Bienert, “Allegoria” und “Anagoge” bei Didymos dem Blinden von 
Alexandria (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1972), 40–43.
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label them distinctly; rather, both were called “allegory.”21 Bienert drew the 
distinction between both sorts of nonliteral exegesis as follows: first, echo-
ing Daniélou, these ways of reading came from divergent backgrounds—
allegory had its origin above all in Stoic scholarship, whereas typology’s 
roots sank into “messianic and eschatological prophecy”;22 and second, 
after citing and dismissing Hanson’s definitions of typology and allegory 
as insufficiently concrete,23 he suggested the following distinction: 
allegory is the vertical manner of interpretation, since it establishes 
unhistorical-timeless relationships between images (allegories) and their 
spiritual archetypes; typology, in contrast, is the horizontal manner of 
interpretation, since it transports the historical events of the past into the 
present and future.24
There are three points of interest here. First, Bienert too invested these 
definitions with evaluative force—typology was laudable, whereas alle-
gory was worthy of censure. Second, unlike Hanson, Bienert insisted that 
allegory did in fact detect correspondences (between “images” and their 
“archetypes”). What really distinguished these two ways of reading, third, 
was the character of their nonliteral referents. Whereas for Daniélou the 
distinction was between christological (typology) and non-christological 
referents (allegory), for Bienert the distinction was between historical 
(typology) and unhistorical referents (allegory).25
Moving forward into the last decade, we turn to Frances Young’s Bibli-
cal Exegesis and the Formation of Christian Culture (1997). Young also 
presses for a distinction between the typological and allegorical interpreta-
tions of Scripture and, like most of her predecessors, the former is accepted, 
whereas the latter is censured. While Young expresses some reservations 
about the distinction,26 and despite her awareness that “‘typology’ is a 
modern coinage,” she insists that it is still “a useful term.”27 Young associ-
21. Bienert, Didymos, 42–43.
22. Bienert, Didymos, 41. 
23. See n. 18 above.
24. Bienert, Didymos, 42. Also see his slightly elaborated definitions on 43. 
25. Though the “horizontal/vertical” definition is not that uncommon in the wider 
literature on patristic exegesis. Cf. H. Crouzel, “La Distinction,” 162–63; R. Greer, 
Early Biblical Interpretation, by R. A. Greer and J. L. Kugel (Philadelphia: West-
minster, 1986), 178, 181, 183; and B. de Margerie, An Introduction to the History 
of Exegesis; Vol. 1: The Greek Fathers, trans. L. Maluf (Petersham, MA: St. Bede’s, 
1993), 111.
26. Cf. F. M. Young, Biblical Exegesis and the Formation of Christian Culture 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 161, 191, 198, 263–64.
27. Young, Biblical Exegesis, 193.
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ates typology (or what she sometimes terms “ikonic mimesis”) with Anti-
ochene exegesis, and allegory (or “symbolic mimesis”) with Alexandrian, 
especially Origen’s.28 Like those who precede her, she too tries to map out 
the cultural backgrounds of Antiochene typology and Alexandrian alle-
gory, though quite differently, locating the former in the rhetorical schools 
and the latter in the philosophical schools of antiquity.29 Drawing upon 
Northrop Frye’s work, Young distinguishes typology from allegory by 
insisting that typology
requires a mirroring of the supposed deeper meaning in the text taken as 
a coherent whole, whereas allegory involves using words as symbols or 
tokens, arbitrarily referring to other realities by application of a code, and 
so destroying the narrative, or surface, coherence of the text.30 
There are two points of interest in this sentence. First, Young draws the 
distinction not on the basis of whether events or texts, respectively, are 
being interpreted (as with Daniélou), nor is there the claim that events 
alone are being interpreted (as with Hanson), but rather there is the insis-
tence that typology and allegory are both concerned with texts. Second, 
and more intriguing, typology is said to be sensitive to narrative coherence 
(what the ancients referred to as the ékolouy¤a or eflrmÒw of a passage), 
whereas allegory destroys this coherence.31 Allegorists interpret violently 
because of their myopic fascination with individual words that are allowed 
to serve only as tokens and that are made to refer arbitrarily to other, 
unrelated realities.32 Young’s distinction between typology and allegory 
28. On 188–89 she uses “allegory” for the Origenist tradition in Alexandria and 
“typology” for the reaction in Antioch (also cf. 191–92).
29. See esp. 169–76, and note her earlier essay, “The Rhetorical Schools and Their 
Influence on Patristic Exegesis” (in The Making of Orthodoxy: Essays in Honour of 
Henry Chadwick, ed. R. Williams [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989], 
182–99) where she developed this idea at length. 
30. Young, Biblical Exegesis, 162. Cf. N. Frye’s The Great Code: The Bible and 
Literature (New York: Harcourt Brace Javanovich, 1982), 85.
31. The charge is explicitly leveled against Origen: “Coherence lay not in the 
text or narrative itself, but in what lay behind it. Origen was happy to decode sym-
bols without worrying about textual or narrative coherence, and the symbols were 
tokens” (Biblical Exegesis, 184; also cf. 200). On the other hand, of the Antiochenes 
she writes: “What they resisted was the type of allegory that destroyed textual coher-
ence” (176; also cf. 182).
32. Again: “The question is whether the mimesis happened through genuine like-
ness or analogy, an ‘ikon’ or image, or by a symbol, a token, something unlike which 
stands for the reality” (Biblical Exegesis, 191, my emphasis; also cf. 162–63, 175 
for the same point).
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brings with it something new to the Origenian scholarship, particularly 
her different account of the cultural backgrounds for these two ways of 
reading, the claim that texts alone and not events are being interpreted, 
and her emphasis upon whether the coherence of a passage was discerned 
or dismantled by the reader.
In John David Dawson’s Christian Figural Reading and the Fashioning 
of Identity (2002) the allegory/typology distinction, including the familiar 
normative judgment that it harbors, again plays a prominent role. How-
ever, instead of the terms “typology” and “allegory,” Dawson prefers “fig-
ural” and “figurative” respectively. A figural reading is one that honors 
and extends the literal sense—it is based upon a conception of language as 
a series of figures that preserve literal meaning. To be distinguished from 
this acceptable nonliteral exegesis is the “figurative” way of reading that 
betrays or undermines this literal sense—it is based upon a conception 
of language as a series of tropes that replace literal meaning with nonlit-
eral meaning.33 This way of distinguishing typology from allegory, novel 
in the Origenian scholarship, is drawn from E. Auerbach and H. Frei,34 
though Dawson departs from both scholars in two notable ways. First, 
he insists that Origen’s nonliteral exegesis is a good deal more typologi-
cal, i.e., figural, than these scholars were willing to grant; and second, 
Dawson wishes to rescue the term “allegorical” by using it synonymously 
with “figural” or “typological” exegesis. “Figurative” is the new pejora-
tive term, the replacement for Auerbach’s and Frei’s “allegorical.”35 For 
our purposes, what is important about Dawson’s work is that a distinc-
tion is once again drawn between acceptable and unacceptable nonliteral 
exegesis, that this distinction is drawn, yet again, in a novel way within 
the Origenian scholarship, and that Dawson has changed the terms with 
33. Dawson, Christian Figural Reading and the Fashioning of Identity (Berkeley 
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002), 12–15.
34. Dawson claims dependence upon Auerbach and Frei for this distinction (Dawson, 
Figural Reading, 10–15, 84–97, 147–49). Key texts include E. Auerbach, “Figura,” 
in Scenes from the Drama of European Literature, ed. W. Godzich and J. Schulte-
Sasse, trans. R. Manheim (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 53–55; 
H. W. Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative: A Study in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-
Century Hermeneutics (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1974), 28–29; H. W. 
Frei, “The ‘Literal Reading’ of Biblical Narrative in the Christian Tradition: Does It 
Stretch or Will It Break?” in The Bible and the Narrative Tradition, ed. F. McConnell 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 75. Note that Dawson also wishes to 
see their definitions already in Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria (at 8.6.1; 9.14; 9.1.4, 
7) (Figural Reading, 14).
35. See Dawson, Figural Reading, 263 n. 6.
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which he labels this distinction, “figural” labeling acceptable nonliteral 
exegesis, “figurative” the unacceptable variety.36
In M. J. Edwards’ Origen against Plato this distinction again plays itself 
out, though not with particular lucidity.37 “While the ancients lacked a 
clear distinction between typology and allegory, they evidently do not 
treat these terms as synonyms . . . .”38 A little later, speaking of Origen, 
Edwards writes: “A thoroughgoing exponent of typology, he did not con-
fuse this with allegory . . . .”39 Edwards comes the closest to distinguishing 
the two when he writes: 
[A]llegory as Origen conceives it is the instrument that mediates between 
the corporeal parsing of the text, which some would term the literal 
reading, and the spiritual divination of its mysteries, which is otherwise 
called typology.40 
Edwards does not expound in greater detail what sort of “instrument” 
allegory is, and how it “mediates” between “corporeal parsing” and “spiri-
tual divination,” i.e., between literal and typological exegesis.
Finally, the recently published guide, the Westminster Handbook to 
Origen, includes articles on “allegory” and “typology” (and, remark-
ably, even “anagogical interpretation”). In his article on “allegory,” J. J. 
O’Keefe writes the following:
Some commentators, however, recognizing that figural reading in one form 
or another is a necessary component of Christian faith, have distinguished 
between “allegorical reading” and “typological reading.” The former, it is 
36. It is also of interest to note that Dawson worked out this distinction differently 
in his earlier work, Allegorical Readers and Cultural Revision in Ancient Alexandria 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1992), 15–16. There he 
wrote that:
the decision to divorce typology from allegory has obscured the underlying 
formal similarity of the two procedures by focusing on material theological con-
siderations . . . . Consequently, in this book, typology is understood to be simply 
one species of allegory; the historical practice of giving texts other meanings 
(allegory) includes a certain subpractice of giving texts other meanings accord-
ing to certain “rules” (typology). On this view, typology is simply a certain kind 
of allegorical reading promoted as nonallegorical for specific theological and 
rhetorical reasons. (16) 
37. M. J. Edwards, Origen against Plato (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002).
38. Edwards, Against Plato, 125.
39. Edwards, Against Plato.
40. Edwards, Against Plato, 126.
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argued, detaches a text from historical events, while the latter continues to 
value history by maintaining a connection.41
Yet O’Keefe, having offered a version of the definition such as was offered 
by Bienert, sounds a skeptical note: “While this modern distinction between 
allegory and typology may seem an attractive way to reconcile patristic 
sensibility with modern exegetical concerns, it must be admitted it does not 
do much to illuminate ancient principles of exegesis.”42 Despite O’Keefe’s 
reservation, the Handbook to Origen still offers an article on “Typology” 
by R. A. Norris. While conceding that the term is only modern, Norris 
proceeds to define it as:
a traditional form of Christian biblical exegesis that reads Old Testament 
reports of certain events, persons, or items as containing “types,” that is, 
as bearing, in addition to their original contextual meaning, a reference 
forward to analogous events, persons, or practices in the New Testament, 
or, to speak more broadly, to the work of Christ and to Christian believers’ 
life [sic] “in Christ.”43 
Norris notes that typology was inherited from Paul and that by Origen’s 
day it was an established tradition of exegesis, whereas allegory was derived 
from Philo and certain Stoic and Platonic philosophers. Up until now this 
is an account largely derived from Daniélou. But Norris continues, admit-
ting that Origen would have been uncomfortable with the gulf modern 
scholars devise between typology and allegory. Typological and allegori-
cal exegesis are not related to one another by juxtaposition, but rather, 
41. J. J. O’Keefe, “Allegory,” in Westminster Handbook to Origen, ed. J. A. Mc-
Guckin (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2004).
42. O’Keefe, “Allegory.” It is interesting to note that O’Keefe (with R. R. Reno) 
has recently sanctioned the distinction between typology and allegory. 
Allegory and typology are part of the same family of reading strategies, often 
referred to by the fathers as “spiritual,” that seek to interpret the scriptures in 
terms of the divine economy. The difference lies in the amount of work the read-
er must put into the interpretation. For a well-functioning typological interpreta-
tion, two figures are brought into association, and the interpretation convinces 
(or not) by virtue of the perceived fit . . . . In contrast, an allegory is nearly 
always a more intentional, explicit, and, for its critics, strained development of 
association . . . . The reader must outline the reality for which the text is a map, 
explaining the coding system of the text so that the message can be read. For 
this reason, an allegorical interpretation often seems a reading laid over the text 
rather than a reading in the text. The interpreter presupposes that the allegorical 
meaning is not evident in the literal sense, and therefore, the reader must strain 
to see it. (J. J. O’Keefe and R. R. Reno, Sanctified Vision, 90) 
43. R. A. Norris, “Typology,” in Westminster Handbook to Origen.
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based upon an umbrella definition of allegory as “language that says one 
thing and means either something more than what it says or something 
other than what it says,” that: 
allegory seems to have labeled a large class of varying strategies in literary 
composition and interpretation; and any argument over the relative 
importance of allegory and typology in Origen’s exegesis might best be 
settled by insisting that for him what we call typology counted, in practice, 
as a species of allegory, which, like all its other species, worked on the basis 
of some perception of “likeness” between two items or situations or levels 
of reality.44 
Here Norris fashions allegory as the genus within which typology is to be 
located—both quest for a likeness between two realities, but as the spe-
cies in this genus, typology more specifically discerns the likeness between 
the “types” in the OT and their referents in the NT. Norris clearly departs 
from the literature surveyed above by not casting allegory and typology 
as rival, nonliteral models of scriptural interpretation.45
This foregoing survey allows us to discern where both consensus and 
disagreement lie among those who distinguish typology from allegory. 
The consensus view can be outlined as follows: typology and allegory are 
competing forms of nonliteral exegesis, the former the successful variety, 
the latter its unsuccessful, nonliteral twin. To the extent that Origen is an 
allegorist, he troubles; to the extent that he is a typologist, he is tolerable 
and perhaps even laudable. With the exception of M. Edwards (for whom 
allegory mediates between literal and typological exegesis) and R. Norris 
(for whom typology is a species of allegory), everyone else has defined these 
as rival, nonliteral approaches to Scripture. At the same time—and this is 
a point that I think has been largely overlooked—it is also clear that the 
scholars who form the consensus differ significantly from one another in 
how they distinguish better from worse forms of nonliteral exegesis for 
Origen. For example, we are told that allegory is not Christian, but rather 
foreign, be it Platonic, Stoic, rabbinic, and/or Philonic (J. Daniélou, R. P. C. 
Hanson, W. A. Bienert, R. A. Norris); allegory is concerned with texts 
44. Norris, “Typology.” 
45. Though locating typology as a species of allegory is not that uncommon in 
other literature on patristic exegesis: cf. R. Grant, The Letter and the Spirit (London: 
S. P. C. K., 1957), 137; M. Simonetti, Lettera e/o Allegoria: Un contributo alla sto-
ria dell’esegesi patristica (Rome: Institutum Patristicum “Augustinianum,” 1985), 24 
n. 32; M. Simonetti, “Allegory-Typology,” in EEC; D. Dawson, Allegorical Readers 
in n. 36 above; and most recently, J. J. O’Keefe and R. R. Reno, Sanctified Vision, 
esp. 19–21, 89–90.
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and not events (J. Daniélou); it is arbitrary (R. P. C. Hanson, F. Young); it 
is unhistorical (W. A. Bienert); it destroys narrative sequence (F. Young); 
it undermines the literal sense (J. D. Dawson). Typology, in contrast, is 
saved from these failings. 
This survey of the literature is integral to the larger argument of my 
paper and it will resurface in its two subsequent sections. But before revis-
iting this survey, I will investigate in the next section Origen’s relevant 
exegetical terminology. The pair éllhgor¤a and éllhgor°v, as well as the 
“typic” family of terms, tÊpow, tupikÒw, and tupik«w, are of importance 
here since the English words “allegory” and “typology” are derived from, 
evoke, and often translate these Greek terms. The analyses of Origen’s 
uses and definitions of these Greek terms will convey that the literature’s 
definitions of “allegory” and “typology” usually mean something differ-
ent, at times something conspicuously different, from what Origen meant 
by their Greek antecedents.46 
EVIDENCE (PART I): ORIGEN’S EXEGETICAL LEXICON
“Allegory”
What immediately strikes the reader of Origen’s corpus is that he does not 
overtly implicate éllhgor¤a and éllhgor°v in either successful or unsuc-
cessful nonliteral exegesis. This pair of Greek terms is easily applied to 
all sorts of readers and texts: to the Greeks interpreting Hesiod’s myths,47 
to those who, with insight into Plato’s teachings, allegorize his myths,48 
to the allegorical readers of Homer49 and other Greek writers,50 but also 
46. The analysis that follows is directly relevant to all the literature surveyed above 
with the exception of J. D. Dawson, since he uses different vocabulary to indicate suc-
cessful and unsuccessful nonliteral exegesis—“figural” and “figurative” respectively. 
Nevertheless, the critique that will be made in this section, that the definitions of “alle-
gory” and “typology” in the literature depart from Origen’s own definitions of their 
Greek antecedents, can also be made of at least one of Dawson’s labels. The Greek 
terms for “figurative interpretation” and “to interpret figuratively” are tropolog¤a and 
tropolog°v respectively (cf. Lampe). But Origen uses these terms interchangeably with 
éllhgor¤a and éllhgor°v (cf. n. 59 below). This raises two difficulties for Dawson: 
first, he wants “allegory” to serve as a synonym for “figural” interpretation, and not 
“figurative” interpretation; and second, it does not appear that “figurative” interpre-
tation for Origen is invested with the polemic that Dawson wishes to give it (again, 
n. 59 and the discussion of Origen’s non-polemical use of “allegory” below). 
47. Cels. 4.38 (SC 136:282.64).
48. Cels. 7.30 (SC 150:82.8).
49. Cels. 8.68 (SC 150:330.17).
50. Cels. 1.18 (SC 132:122.7); Cels. 4.48 (SC 136:308.15–17).
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to the heterodox interpreters of Scripture,51 to Jews and Christians in the 
reading of the Old Testament,52 and to Christians interpreting Scripture 
in accordance with Gal 4.24 (“Now this is an allegory: these women are 
two covenants . . . .”).53 The Bible is replete with “allegories.”54 Origen 
even makes the argument against Celsus that the Scriptures are in fact 
“receptive of an allegorical interpretation.”55 Not surprisingly, Origen 
can speak of himself as an allegorist: “And we must first say that just as 
when we find written of God that he has eyes and eyelids and ears, hands 
and arms and feet, and indeed even wings, we change what is written into 
an allegory . . . .”56 
Whatever Origen understands “allegorical exegesis” to be, it is certainly 
not by definition unacceptable nonliteral exegesis, otherwise (we can safely 
surmise) he would never have referred to himself as an allegorist. In fact, 
éllhgor¤a and éllhgor°v find wide application in his writings and appear 
simply to label the nonliteral reading of texts, a reading which may, or may 
not, turn out to be felicitous. For instance, in Against Celsus 4.38, Origen 
leaves up for discussion whether an allegorical reader of an Hesiodic myth 
“is successful in the allegory or not,”57 and earlier in this same work he 
writes that “we must examine the allegories one by one to see if they are 
sound.”58 In Origen’s hands, then, “allegory” does not serve as a marker 
for unacceptable nonliteral exegesis—some allegorical interpretations are 
legitimate, and others are not.
51. Jo. 20.166 (GCS 4:352.11). Probably also Jo. 13.51 (GCS 4:233.21).
52. Cels. 4.38 (SC 136: 278.7); Cels. 4.49 (SC 136:310.9); Cels. 4.87 (SC 
136:402.31).
53. Cels. 4.44 (SC 136:298.25–37; SC 136:298.44); Jo. 20.74 (GCS 4:339.11–16, 
passim); Princ. 4.2.6 (Vier Bücher von den Prinzipien, ed. by H. Görgemanns and H. 
Karpp, 3rd ed. [Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1992], 716:316.12). 
“GK” as the abbreviation to subsequent references to the critical text of On First 
Principles.
54. Cels. 1.50 (SC 132:212.10); Jo. 6.22 (GCS 4:111.6).
55. Cels. 4.49 (SC 136:310.18): . . . §pid°jasyai éllhgor¤an.
56. Jo. 13.131 (GCS 4:245.24–27): Ka‹ pr«ton lekt°on, ˜ti Àsper ÙfyalmoÁw 
ka‹ bl°fara ka‹ Œta, xe›rãw te ka‹ brax¤onaw ka‹ pÒdaw eÍr¤skontew gegramm°na 
toË yeoË, ¶ti d¢ ka‹ pt°rugaw, metalambãnomen efiw éllhgor¤an tå gegramm°na. Also 
cf. Jo. 1.180 (GCS 4:33.23–25); 20.67 (GCS 4:337.25); 20.329 (GCS 4:376.11); 
13.101 (GCS 4:240.30). Also cf. Princ. 4.2.6 (GK 716:216.12); Comm. in Matt. 
17.35 (GCS 10:698.24). The true disciple of Jesus is an allegorical reader: Jo. 10.127 
(GCS 4:201.23). 
57. Cels. 4.38 (SC 136:282.64–65): e‡tÉ §pitugxãnonta §n tª éllhgor¤& e‡te ka‹ mÆ. 
58. Cels. 3.23 (SC 136:54.13): fld¤& m¢n §jetast°on tåw éllhgor¤aw, efi tÚ Ígi¢w 
¶xousin. That allegorical interpretations can be either sound or “unsound” is again 
mentioned at Jo. 13.51 (GCS 4:233.21).
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Since we find him using this Greek pair of terms of a wide variety of 
readers and of an equally wide variety of texts with little, if any, pejorative 
connotation, it would certainly suggest that Origen defines éllhgor¤a and 
éllhgor°v in such a way that these terms are not shaded with evaluative 
tones. While he never offered a straightforward definition of either of these 
terms in his extant writings (“by allegory I mean . . .”), we can certainly 
surmise a working definition of “allegory” since he employed numerous 
words that were interchangeable with éllhgor¤a and éllhgor°v.59 One 
of these terms is sÊmbolon and it surfaces in Against Celsus 2.69, one of 
Origen’s more concise and illuminating discussions of allegorical exege-
sis.60 There he writes:
The events recorded to have happened to Jesus do not possess the full view 
of the truth in the mere letter and history [§n cilª tª l°jei ka‹ tª flstor¤a]; 
for each recorded event is shown to be also a symbol of something else 
[sÊmbolÒn tinow e‰nai] by those who read Scripture more intelligently.61
59. For example, éllhgor¤a and éllhgor°v are used interchangeably with 
tropolog¤a (Cels. 4.38 [SC 136:278.6–7]; 4.44 [SC 136:298.24]; 4.48 [SC 136:306.1–
308.17 with 308.35–36]; 4.49 [SC 136:310.4–12]) and tropolog°v (cf. Cels. 1.17 
[SC 132:120.4]; 1.18 [SC 132:122.9–10]; 4.49 [SC 136:310.9–15]), with énagvgÆ 
(Jo. 4.22 [GCS 4:111.7]; 13.101 [GCS 4:240.31–32]) and énãgv (Jo. 1.180 [GCS 
4:33.23–24]; 10.174 [GCS 4:201.26–27]; 13.270–271 [GCS 4:267.1, 4, 6]; 13.454 
[GCS 4:297.11–13]; 20.166 [GCS 4:352.14–15]), with pneumatikÒw (two very similar 
dossiers of Pauline texts supporting nonliteral interpretation are cited at Cels. 4.49 [SC 
136:310.18] and Princ. 4.2.6 [GK 714:315.15] and in the latter they are considered 
instances of a pneumatikØ diÆghsiw whereas in the former, instances of éllhgor¤a) and 
pneumatik«w (Cels. 2.3 [SC 132:286.15–18]; Jo. 20.67 [GCS 4:337.31–32]), and also 
with ÍpÒnoia (Cels. 4.38 [SC 136:292.64–66]). In fact, the general principle appears 
to be that while Origen draws upon a rich vocabulary to describe his exegetical 
practice, most of these terms fall into two categories: those that describe nonliteral 
(ascending, figurative, tropological, allegorical, spiritual, symbolic, etc.) exegesis on 
the one hand, and those that describe literal exegesis (exegesis according to the let-
ter, according to history) on the other. R. Gögler is, I think, correct when he writes: 
“Tropologie, Typologie, Allegorie und deren zugehörige Begriffe haben bei Origenes 
einen großen Bedeutungsfächer und meinen im Grunde nichts anderes als symbolische 
Redeweise” (Zur Theologie des Biblischen Wortes, 362).
60. A “symbol” in Scripture is an “allegory,” and as such, is receptive of an “alle-
gorical” interpretation. For example, the things that happened to Abraham, Origen 
says, “happened allegorically [Gal 4.24]” (Jo. 20.74) and thus “we must [interpret] 
the whole story of Abraham allegorically” [de› pçsan tØn katå tÚn ÉAbraåm éllh-
goroËnta flstor¤an] (Jo. 20.67 [GCS 4:337.31]). A few lines later, referring to one 
episode in this story, Gen 12.4 where it says: “And Lot went with him [Abram]” as 
the two departed Haran, Origen writes of this verse that “it was a symbol” [sÊmbo-
lon ∑n] (Jo. 20.69 [GCS 4:338.20]).
61. Cels. 2.69 (SC 132:446.3–7): Tå sumbebhk°nai énagegramm°na t“ ÉIhsoË 
oÈk §n cilª tª l°jei ka‹ tª flstor¤& tØn pçsan ¶xei yevr¤an t∞w élhye¤aw: ßkaston 
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Here we have the basic account of an allegorical exegesis—the intelligent 
reader is not content with the l°jiw and flstor¤a of a passage, but can also 
show how such a passage is a “symbol of something else.” In the case 
of the above excerpt from Against Celsus, Origen recognizes that Jesus’ 
crucifixion is an event that has transpired and has significance for its time 
and place, that this event has a “literal significance.”62 But this event also 
symbolizes, Origen insists, the truth indicated in the verse: “I am crucified 
with Christ” (Gal 2.20), and he provides several other Pauline texts where 
the crucifixion and death of Christ are referred symbolically, i.e., allegori-
cally, to something other than the actual event, namely to the “crucifixion” 
and “death” of Christians.63 
In sum, we are dealing here with a formal account of allegorical exege-
sis, a sort of reading that can be practiced by a wide spectrum of ancient 
readers, not just Christians, on an even wider spectrum of ancient texts, not 
just the Christian Scriptures.64 Allegory is simply the quest for the “other” 
(sometimes “lofty,” other times “deeper”) referent, a mode of interpreta-
tion whose real rival is not some other form of nonliteral interpretation 
(i.e., typology), but rather literal interpretation.65 And precisely because 
går aÈt«n ka‹ sÊmbolÒn tinow e‰nai parå to›w sunet≈teron §ntugxãnousi tª grafª 
épode¤knutai. 
62. Cels. 2.69 (SC 132:450.49): tå d¢ t∞w l°jevw.
63. A little later in the same section of Against Celsus Origen offers another similar 
account of allegorical exegesis, this time calling an event in Scripture not a sÊmbo-
lon but rather a shmantikÒn (“sign”) and describing the exegetical movement from 
the event to its signified nonliteral reality as an énãbasiw (“ascent”): “However, the 
explanation of these matters and ascent [énabãsevw] from the events recorded to have 
happened up to the realities of which the events were signs [shmantikã], someone 
would set forth at both greater length and in a more divine manner . . . .” (Tå m¢n 
oÔn t∞w dihgÆsevw ka‹ t∞w épÚ t«n gegon°nai énagegramm°nvn énabãsevw §p‹ tå prãg-
mata, œn tå genÒmena ∑n shmantikã, ka‹ meizÒnvw ên tiw ka‹ yeiot°rvw dihgÆsaito . . . . 
[Cels. 2.69 (SC 132:450.45–48); Chadwick modified].)
64. For other instances of Origen’s formal understanding of nonliteral exegesis, cf. 
Princ. 4.2.2 (GK 702:309.10–11); 4.2.6 (GK 714:315.15); Comm. in Matt. 12.3 (GCS 
10:73.10); and especially prol. Cant. (GCS 8:76.20–22). Origen’s formal understand-
ing of allegorical interpretation is in keeping with the formal definition of composi-
tional allegory in the Homeric Problems: ÑO gãr êlla m¢n égoreÊvn trÒpow, ßtera d¢ 
œn l°gei shma¤nvn, §pvnÊmvw éllhgor¤a kale›tai (Heraclitus, Héraclite: Allégories 
d’Homère, Félix Buffière, ed., 2nd ed. [Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1989], 5.2). “Alle-
gory is named eponymously, for it is the trope which proclaims one set of things but 
in fact signifies other things different from what it says.”
65. The nonliteral quest is contrasted to a literal exegesis that aims to identify the 
basic (“immediate,” “at hand,” “obvious”) referent. Terms like bayÊteron (“deeper”) 
(Cels. 3.7 [SC 136:26.1]; Comm. in Matt. 13.2 [GCS 10:183.28] and the “ascent” 
family (énagvgÆ, etc.—cf. nn. 59 and 76) are affiliated with allegorical exegesis. On 
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this formal definition of allegorical exegesis, as the quest for the “other” 
referent, is not saddled with polemical considerations, Origen can employ 
a term like éllhgor¤a in situations where proper or improper allegorical 
exegesis might occur. Such an understanding of allegory runs counter to 
most of the literature surveyed above, where Origenian “allegory” served 
as a marker for deficient, nonliteral exegesis.
“Typology”
“Typology” is a relatively recent English word that is occasionally 
employed to translate the “typic” family of Greek terms from which it 
is, in part, derived.66 These terms—tÊpow, tupikÒw, and tupik«w—play a 
considerable role in Origen’s exegetical lexicon as he often speaks of (and 
practices) the interpretation of scriptural tÊpoi. In what follows, I will 
investigate in some detail his uses and definitions of these terms in explic-
itly exegetical contexts.
When Origen refers to a tÊpow in Scripture, the term can usually be 
defined as a “representation,” “image,” “symbol,” or “figure” of some-
thing. More often than not, a tÊpow has a positive connotation, i.e., the 
figure in question, be it a person, place, or thing, indicates another higher 
reality, what Origen invariably terms the élÆyeia (and interestingly, never 
ént¤tupow67). Thus, Jonah’s whale is a figure of the devil,68 and the temple 
and Jesus’ body are figures of the church, etc.69 In his comments on John 
5.46 (“If you believed Moses, you would believe me, for he wrote of me”), 
the other hand, adjectives like prÒxeirow (Philoc. 27.12 [SC 226:308.6]) and §pipÒlaiow 
(Princ. 4.3.11 [GK 762:340.4]; Hom. in Jer. 18.4.1 [SC 238:186.4]), both of which 
mean “within reach” or “obvious” can describe literal exegesis.
66. The English term “typology” was first coined in the mid-nineteenth century. 
It is an adaptation of the Latin typologia, itself a term derived from the combination 
of tÊpow with lÒgow. The Latin noun typologia is not attested in ancient and patristic 
Latin usage (based upon a search of the PL Database and Cetedoc) and appears, in 
fact, also to be the product of the nineteenth century’s imagination. (According to 
A. C. Charity, Events and Their Afterlife [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1966], 171 n. 2, the Latin noun “typologia” first appeared ca. 1840 and the Eng-
lish “typology” ca. 1844.) Furthermore, the Greek noun tupolog¤a has only recently 
made an appearance in modern Greek, though the term is infrequent and is seldom, 
if ever, applied to biblical exegesis. 
67. There are only three references to this noun in Origen’s extant corpus: Cels. 
2.61 (SC 132:428.10) with the sense of “firm, solid” (Lampe, s.v. ént¤tupow B.2); 
Princ. 3.1.15 (GK 514:221.16) and Hom. in Jer. 6.3 (SC 232:336.14) with the sense 
of “obstinate” (Lampe, s.v. ént¤tupow B.3).
68. Or. 13.4 (GCS 2:329.1).
69. Jo. 10.228 (GCS 4:209.17). Also cf. Jo. 2.63 (GCS 4:63.3–4); Cels. 2.2 (SC 
132:284.37); Princ. 4.3.7 (GK 750:333.16), etc.
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Origen writes: “One can find, therefore, that most of the things recorded in 
the law refer tupik«w and afinigmat≈dvw to the Christ.”70 The concatenated 
adverb afinigmat≈dvw (from the noun a‡nigma, “riddle,” “figure,” or “sym-
bol”71) is paralleled to tupik«w, “figuratively,” both adverbs indicating the 
symbolic potential of the law to refer nonliterally to the Christ. It is along 
these same lines that Origen understands the adverb tupik«w in a verse he 
frequently cites, 1 Cor 10.11: “all these things happened tupik«w . . . .” 
Origen understands the adverb in this verse to mean “figuratively,” and 
thus, interprets Paul to be saying that the events that transpired under the 
old covenant served as figures of other, later, higher realities.72 Particularly 
important for my purposes is a passage in Origen’s Commentary on First 
Corinthians. Here he can actually describe a scriptural event as both “alle-
gorical” and “figurative,” making no meaningful distinction between the 
two. Contending for the wisdom of not marrying twice, Origen censures 
any man who takes a second wife on the pattern of Abraham, since such 
a man has not understood that the events of Abraham’s life were meant 
to be taken allegorically. Referring to Abraham and his wives, Origen 
writes: “‘these things §stin éllhgoroÊmena [happened allegorically],’ and 
‘these are two covenants,’ [Gal 4.24] since ‘these things happened tupik«w 
[figuratively] to them, and were written for us upon whom the end of the 
ages has come’” [1 Cor 10.11].73 In this passage from his Commentary 
Origen easily juxtaposes two independent Pauline expressions, one from 
Galatians and the other from 1 Corinthians, moving effortlessly between 
describing Abraham’s two wives and two sons as an allegorical and as 
a typical (or typological) phenomenon. This piece of evidence strikingly 
indicates how a typological phenomenon for Origen was not opposed to 
an allegorical one.74
70. Jo. 1.161 (GCS 4:251.6–7): tupik«w m¢n oÔn ka‹ afinigmat≈dvw énaferÒmena efiw 
tÚn xristÚn t«n énagegramm°nvn §n t“ nÒmƒ ple›sta ˜sa ¶stin eÍre›n.
71. Lampe, s.v. a‡nigma 1, 2 and 3.
72. Other places where 1 Cor 10.11 is cited: Cels. 4.43 (SC 136:294.18); Princ. 
4.2.6 (GK 716:316.6–7); Jo. 1.34 (GCS 4:11.12); Fr. in Lc. 15 (GCS 9:239.5); Comm. 
in I Cor. 35 (JTS 9 [1908], 504.28–30). 
73. Comm. in I Cor. 35 (JTS 9 [1908], 504.28–30): “ÜAtinã §stin éllhgoroÊmena,” 
ka‹ “atai gãr efisi dÊo diay∞kai: taËta” går “tupik«w sun°bainen §ke¤noiw, §grãfh 
d° “diÉ ≤mçw” efiw oÓw tå t°lh t«n afi≈nvn katÆnthken. 
74. There is more evidence for this point as well. Cf. Princ. 4.2.6 (GK 716:316.11) 
where Origen cites Heb 8.5 (doing all things katå tÚn tÊpon shown on the mountain) 
and immediately thereafter quotes Gal 4.24 (“these things §stin éllhgoroÊmena [hap-
pened allegorically]”) within a long list of biblical texts, all of which are intended 
to help him make his point that there is such a thing as a spiritual interpretation of 
Scripture. Here again there is no distinction drawn between a “figurative” (Heb 8.5) 
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In these, as well as in the other passages where tupik«w is similarly used, 
the idea is that Scripture is composed in a manner symbolic of another 
(higher) reality.75 It follows, then, that the proper interpretation of a 
scriptural tÊpow ought to be a nonliteral one, i.e., an exegesis in search 
of what the figure figures. We would expect, in other words, that Origen 
would have little difficulty using terms like “allegory” (or its extensive 
list of synonyms) to discuss the nonliteral interpretation of tÊpoi. And 
this is precisely what we find. The terms he customarily uses to describe 
the nonliteral interpretation of Scripture’s tÊpoi, particularly énãgv76 and 
pneumatikÒw,77 are also the very terms that he uses interchangeably with 
éllhgor°v and éllhgor¤a.78 For example, in On First Principles 4.2.6 Ori-
gen explicitly justifies the “spiritual interpretation” (pneumatikØ diÆghsiw) 
of Scripture by reminding the reader that the events recorded in Scripture 
and an “allegorical” event (Gal 4.24), both of which stand in need of a “spiritual” 
interpretation. 
It is also, moreover, of interest that Celsus too does not appear to draw a hard dis-
tinction between a figure and an allegory. He uses the adjective tupoeidÆw [tup≈dhw], 
defined as “in the form of a figure” (Lampe, s.v. tupoeidÆw, 2), to modify the noun 
éllhgor¤a when he criticizes Christians for interpreting Moses’ cosmogony and his 
law diã tinow . . . tup≈douw éllhgor¤aw, i.e., “through some figurative allegory” (Cels. 
6.29 [SC 147:250.7]). It would certainly be odd for Celsus to modify the noun “alle-
gory” with this adjective if he thought a tÊpow was, in fact, quite different from an 
éllhgor¤a.
75. Note that a tÊpow can be synonymous to a sÊmbolon in Origen’s writings. 
In Comm. in Matt. 12.9 he refers to Jeremiah as a tÊpow of Christ and at the end 
of this section, returning to Jeremiah, he notes how “most of the prophets took up 
some things which were symbolic of him [Christ]” (˜ti ofl ple›stoi t«n profht«n 
sumbolikã tina aÈtoË éneilÆfasin) (Comm. in Matt. 12.9 [GCS 10:84.12–13]). In 
Comm. in Matt. 11.17 Origen again employs a tÊpow interchangeably with a sÊm-
bolon (GCS 10:63.1–2).
76. Cf. Princ. 4.3.7 where Eve and Cain are §ktup≈mata (types) of the church 
because Paul interpreted Eve as efiw tØn §kklhs¤an énagom°nh (Princ. 4.3.7 [GK 
750:333.24–28]); also cf. Jo. 10.266–267 (GCS 4:215.32–216.4).
77. In Princ. 4.2.6 (GK 714:315.15) a “spiritual interpretation” includes the non-
literal reading of a figure; in Jo. 13.110 (GCS 4:242.17) the literal reader of figures 
is opposed to the one who reads spiritually; in Cels. 2.2 the nonliteral interpretation 
of a figure equates to “the interpretation of the law according to the spiritual sense” 
(t∞w toË nÒmou katå tå pneumatikå dihgÆsevw) (SC 132:284.33–34); in Or. 13.4 there 
is the need to interpret figures spiritually to find their mysteries (GCS 2:329.1).
78. For éllhgor¤a and éllhgor°v as interchangeable with énagvgÆ, cf. Jo. 4.22 
(GCS 4:111.7); 13.101 (GCS 4:240.31–32); as interchangeable with énãgv, cf. Jo. 
1.180 (GCS 4:33.23–24); 10.174 (GCS 4:201.26–27); 13.270–271 (GCS 4:267.1, 4, 6); 
13.454 (GCS 4:297.11–13); 20.166 (GCS 4:352.14–15). For examples of éllhgor¤a/
éllhgor°v as interchangeable with or at least closely related to pneumatikÒw, cf. Jo. 
13.51; Princ. 4.2.6; Cels. 2.4.
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happened tupik«w as Paul had indicated in 1 Cor 10.11.79 After citing this 
verse Origen proceeds to note that Paul “also provides starting-points [for 
determining] of what each of those things were figures [tÊpoi], saying: “For 
they drank of that spiritual rock that followed them, and that rock was 
Christ [1 Cor 10.4].”80 The figurative character of biblical events and the 
apostle’s suggestions of what those events figured serve here as a guide for 
the “spiritual,” i.e., allegorical, interpretation of Scripture. This point is 
of further relevance to the assessment of the prevailing allegory/typology 
distinction, since it undermines the notion of “typology” as somehow a 
rival to allegory. For Origen, scriptural figures (tÊpoi) ought to be inter-
preted allegorically.81 
As we continue the survey of the “typic” terms in exegetical contexts, 
it is especially important to highlight those passages where Origen can 
speak of the improper nonliteral interpretation of Scripture’s figures, i.e., 
cases when the reader has found the wrong élÆyeia. For example, he criti-
cizes those who think that the Jewish Passover at the Exodus is a tÊpow 
of Christ’s passion. “The Passover,” Origen writes, “is indeed a type of 
Christ, but certainly not of his passion”82 for the simple reason that the 
dissimilarity between these events is too great: whereas righteous people 
killed the first paschal lambs, Jesus was put to death by “criminals and 
sinners.”83 Or again, in On First Principles 4.2.2 our author criticizes the 
simpliciores’ nonliteral interpretation of the tabernacle-as-tÊpow. These 
simpler Christians correctly understand that the tabernacle is a figure of 
something, but they usually fall into error when they attempt to discern 
what it figures.84 For Origen, the nonliteral reading of a tÊpow can tran-
spire successfully or unsuccessfully, a point that is also pertinent to our 
discussion, since it subverts the literature’s consensus view of “typology” 
as, by definition, a successful form of nonliteral exegesis.
79. Princ. 4.2.6 (GK 714:315.15).
80. Princ. 4.2.6 (GK 716:316.8–9): ka‹ éformåw d¤dvsi toË t¤nvn §ke›na tÊpoi 
§tÊgxanon, l°gvn: “¶pinon går §k pneumatik∞w ékolouyoÊshw p°traw, ≤ d¢ p°tra ∑n 
ı XristÒw.”
81. Other examples of the nonliteral, symbolical, or allegorical interpretation of 
a tÊpow include: Cels. 2.2 (SC 132:284.37); Princ. 4.3.7 (GK 750:333.16); Jo. 1.46 
(GCS 4:13.12–14); 6.15 (GCS 4:109.23–25).
82. Pascha 13 (B. Witte, Die Schrift des Origenes “Über das Passa” [Altenberge: 
Oros, 1993], 102.22–23): ka‹ tÊpow m¢n XristoË §stin tÚ pãsxa, oÈ m°ntoi ge toË pãy-
ouw aÈtoË. Also cf. Pascha 14 (B. Witte, Passa, 104.22–24).
83. Pascha 12–14 (B. Witte, Passa, 102.16). Cf. the extended discussion and cita-
tion of this passage below, at ft. 101.
84. Princ. 4.2.2 (GK 702:309.7). Also cf. the critique of Heracleon’s reading of a 
scriptural tÊpow at Jo. 10.117–118 (GCS 4:190.30–191.4).
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Finally, we can complete this survey of the typic terms by attending to 
one additional set of texts that complicates the picture considerably. For 
Origen someone can read a passage “typically,” or be enamored with its 
“types,” and not be interpreting these figures nonliterally, as we would 
expect, but rather precisely the opposite, be performing a deficient literal 
interpretation of Scripture’s figures. In these passages, Origen will actually 
indicate the literal interpretation of a tÊpow without availing himself of 
any additional expression for reading “literally” (katå tØn l°jin, prÚw tÚ 
grãmma, etc.). Rather, he will simply state that someone is reading Scripture 
“typically” or is only interested in the “type.” How is this possible?
To decipher this puzzling situation we need to attend to an important 
and neglected ambiguity that characterizes his use of the “typic” family of 
terms.85 As already indicated above, a tÊpow for Origen is a “symbol” or 
“figure.” Usually he will stress the salutary symbolic character of a tÊpow: 
the figure is seen as referential, pointing beyond itself to its élÆyeia, and 
on this definition, the one who interprets tupik«w interprets figuratively, 
i.e., nonliterally. However, there are also times when the emblematic qual-
ity of the tÊpow recedes and the emphasis is now upon the tÊpow as a mere 
“symbol” or “figure,” i.e., as only a distinct, inferior, and even contrast-
ing version of its élÆyeia. In this latter case, the “typic” term inevitably 
surfaces in a pejorative context and its new lexical nuance dramatically 
changes how Origen can use the term: when the accent now rests upon the 
tÊpow as an inferior version of its élÆyeia, the one who interprets tupik«w 
or is preoccupied with the tÊpow is not interpreting the figure nonliterally, 
but rather literally with an eye only for the mere figure and not for that 
which it figures.86 I will offer two examples of this latter scenario.
In Against Celsus 6.70 Origen refers in a derogatory manner to the 
Samaritans and Jews who “were doing the commands of the law svmatik«w 
ka‹ tupik«w.”87 He continues, clarifying: these groups worship God “in 
the flesh and carnal sacrifices” and to this sort of worship is opposed the 
Christian worship of God “in spirit and in truth” (Jn 4.24). “The Father 
85. Only H. Crouzel hints that there might be some tension within this word group 
when he notes that to act tupik«w can in some cases mean not acting symbolically, 
but rather “remaining at the type” (Origène et la “Connaissance Mystique” [Paris: 
Desclée de Brouwer, 1961], 225). The note refers to Cels. 6.70 which will be discussed 
in greater detail below. Crouzel does not explain this tension or its significance for 
discussions of “typology” in Origen.
86. For the confusion that this ambiguity caused in Greek patristic literature, cf. 
Lampe, s.v. tÊpow C.4.
87. Cels. 6.70 (SC 147:354.28–356.30): §pe‹ ka‹ Samare›w ka‹ ÉIouda›oi svmatik«w 
ka‹ tupik«w §po¤oun tå prostattÒmena ÍpÚ toË nÒmou.
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must not be worshipped §n tÊpoiw but rather §n élhye¤& which came by 
Jesus Christ after the law was given by Moses.”88 What does Origen mean 
when he criticizes the Jews and Samaritans for performing the law tupik«w 
and a little later, for worshipping the Father merely §n tÊpoiw of the Mosaic 
law? If we take our cues from the literature’s definitions of “typology” 
(some form of “nonliteral exegesis”), or simply follow the only definition 
offered in Lampe for tupik«w (“symbolically”), we would expect that the 
one who interprets Scripture tupik«w interprets it in a symbolic or nonlit-
eral manner. On this reading, Origen would be suggesting that the Jews 
and Samaritans interpret the law, and hence perform it, according to the 
higher reality symbolized by the law. But here Origen has precisely the 
opposite in mind. Interpreting the commands of the law tupik«w means 
reading the law not “figuratively” (nonliterally), but rather, “in accord-
ance with the figure alone” (i.e., literally). Not only the adjoined adverb 
svmatik«w,89 but also the explicit reference to the physical sacrifices of 
Jews and Samaritans, and Origen’s clear contrast between those who wor-
ship §n élhye¤& and those who worship §n tÊpoiw, support this reading. 
By interpreting Scripture tupik«w Origen means here that the reader is 
enamored with the mere figures in the law and not with the higher reali-
ties to which they point.90 
There is another instance of this curious use of the typic family of terms 
in the Commentary on John where Origen again pejoratively describes 
the interpreter of tÊpoi as a literalist. Commenting on John 4.23 (“But 
the hour is coming and now is when the true worshippers will worship 
the Father in spirit and truth”), he sets up the familiar contrast between 
those who worship the Father §n élhye¤& and those who offer an inferior 
worship tÊpoiw.91 Who is this latter worshipper? This is the interpreter of 
Scripture, he answers, “who is enslaved to the letter that kills” (2 Cor 3.6) 
88. Cels. 6.70 (SC 147:356.38–40): ÉAllå ka‹ oÈk §n tÊpoiw “proskune›n de›” 
t“ patr‹ éllÉ “§n élhye¤&,” ¥tiw “diå ÉIhsoË XristoË §g°neto” metå tÚ doy∞nai tÚn 
nÒmon “diå Mv#s°vw.”
89. For a contrast, recall how in Jo. 1.161 (cf. n. 70 above) he could parallel 
tupik«w with afinigmat≈dvw (“symbolically”). 
90. As such, the only definition offered for tupik«w in Lampe (“symbolically”) fails 
to indicate how polysemic this adverb actually is. In addition to this entry, the lexi-
con should also have an entry such as, “according to the mere figure,” i.e., literally. 
H. Chadwick’s translation of this passage from Cels. properly indicates an aware-
ness of Origen’s ambiguous use of tupik«w: instead of rendering it “symbolically” or 
“figuratively,” he translates it as “outwardly” (H. Chadwick, Origen: Contra Celsum 
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953], 384).
91. Jo. 13.109 (GCS 4:242.16–17). Also cf. Cels. 4.44 (SC 136:298.34–37) where 
this contrast is again articulated: it is not the physical acts of Abraham that are to 
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and “does not follow the spiritual meanings of the law.”92 This one, Origen 
continues, “is utterly engrossed in the figures and bodily meanings” (˜low 
t«n tÊpvn ka‹ t«n svmatik«n �n).93 A little later he describes these readers 
as “enslaved to the figure” (toÁw t“ tÊpƒ dedoulvm°nouw), a clear parallel 
to Paul’s “enslaved to the letter” which Origen had directly cited above 
in his Commentary.94 In this excerpt from the Commentary the reader 
engrossed in the tÊpow is not concerned with what the figure figures, but 
rather precisely the opposite, has failed to appreciate what is figured and 
is, thus, entrapped in only a literal appreciation of the figure. 
In sum, this terminological investigation into Origen’s use of the “typic” 
family of terms in exegetical contexts allows us to see how two different 
emphases in the definition of a tÊpow have dramatic implications for how 
Origen can refer to biblical passages that were either written or understood 
“typically.” When the tÊpow is an inferior and even contrasting version 
of its élÆyeia, the interpreter who is engrossed in this sort of “type,” or 
who reads “typically,” is engaged in the unsuccessful, literal interpreta-
tion of this tÊpow. This interpreter has failed to embark upon a search 
for the élÆyeia, i.e., has read the figure only literally. On the other hand, 
when the accent rests upon the tÊpow as a positive, referential trope, syn-
onymous with other tropes like an “allegory” or a “symbol,” a passage 
written “typically” ought, correspondingly, to be interpreted nonliterally 
in search of the élÆyeia. This nonliteral interpretation is nothing other 
than an “allegorical interpretation” (or any of its numerous synonymous 
expressions), and it may, or may not, turn out to be successful.
A First Evaluation of the Literature
As I indicated in the survey of the scholarship above, most of the litera-
ture has formed a consensus around “allegory” and “typology” serving as 
markers for the unsuccessful and successful nonliteral interpretations of 
Scripture respectively. (Norris, in concert with a few others, proves to be 
the main exception to this consensus when he contends that typology is a 
species of the genus, allegory.) The analysis of Origen’s relevant exegetical 
terminology in this section indicates, however, that the consensus defini-
tions of “allegory” and “typology,” and on occasion even Norris’s defini-
be emulated by Jesus’ followers, but rather the patriarch’s spiritual actions which are 
discerned through an allegorical interpretation of his physical actions.
92. Jo. 13.110 (GCS 4:242.17–20): ka‹ ı grãmmati d¢ t“ époktinnÒnti dedoulvm°now 
. . . mhd¢ to›w pneumatiko›w ékolouy«n toË nÒmou.
93. Jo. 13.110 (GCS 4:242.21–22). Also cf. Cels. 6.70 (SC 147:354.28).
94. Jo. Jn 13.111 (GCS 4:242.26).
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tions, run in a very different direction from Origen’s own accounts of the 
Greek terms that stand behind these English nouns. These discrepancies, 
as well as their consequences, can be summarized as follows.
Concerning “allegory,” Norris’s definition is correct, that an “allegori-
cal” interpretation for Origen is simply the search for the nonliteral refer-
ent, an interpretation that may, or may not, turn out well. The majority 
of the literature, however, supplements this simple, formal definition with 
an evaluative component (“unsuccessful”), and thus also with a competi-
tor (the “successful” variant, “typology”) that is simply not confirmed by 
Origen’s own definitions and uses of éllhgor¤a/éllhgor°v. For him, an 
allegorical interpretation is not inherently successful or deficient (some alle-
gorical interpretations turn out to be successful, while others do not) and 
allegory’s real competitor is not some other form of nonliteral exegesis, but 
rather literalism. There is, then, a significant discrepancy between Origen’s 
account of éllhgor¤a and the literature’s definition of “allegory.” 
The situation is similar with “typology.” Among most of those who 
endorse the allegory/typology distinction, the consensus definition of 
“typology” as “successful, nonliteral exegesis” fails to conform in at least 
four ways to how Origen uses and defines tÊpow, tupikÒw, and tupik«w in 
exegetical contexts. First, he does not use any of the “typic” terms as most 
of the literature does, as global labels of acceptable, nonliteral exegesis; 
when Origen uses these terms in exegetical contexts, he is, rather, referring 
specifically to the interpretation of a tÊpow. Second, even when tÊpoi are 
read nonliterally (though they do not have to be), there is no suggestion 
that this is an inherently successful exercise since, as I have also shown, 
Origen can clearly speak of unsuccessful nonliteral interpretations of 
tÊpoi. And third, there is no hint that Origen opposes the “typic” terms 
in exegetical contexts to “allegory.” Not only is a tÊpow, as a figure of 
speech, synonymous with an “allegory,” but the nonliteral interpretation 
of this tÊpow is itself an allegorical interpretation. The very task of the 
allegorical interpretation of a tÊpow is to discern its élÆyeia. It is impor-
tant to underscore that Origen does not reserve any special terms for the 
nonliteral reading of a scriptural tÊpow—they are the very terms used 
throughout his writings for allegory.95 With respect to each of these three 
95. H. de Lubac has also made this point, though without reference to Origen: 
“Far from the customary opposition of these two terms, one ought to say that alle-
gorical interpretation, in its traditional meaning, consists in discerning the types or 
the figures in Israel that announce the Christ—all of Israel announced the whole 
Christ. It [allegorical interpretation] establishes the relationship of the figure to the 
truth, of the letter to the spirit, of the old to the new. It shows how what is said 
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points, the consensus definitions of “typology” are suspect, while Norris, 
who understands “typology” as simply the allegorical interpretation of 
a “type,” is, in fact, closer to the target. However, there is also a fourth 
way in which Origen’s use of the “typic” family of terms challenges Norris 
(and the consensus literature as well). As I indicated in some detail above, 
one of the most striking features of Origen’s “typic” language is that he 
can use it, on occasion, to describe the unsuccessful, literal exegesis of a 
tÊpow. The point here is not simply that a tÊpow can be read literally, but 
that its literal reading is indicated precisely by the “typic” terms. Such a 
use runs directly counter to the shared definition of “typology” as, at the 
very least, some form of nonliteral exegesis. In sum, then, there is a series 
of major discrepancies between the literature’s definition of “typology” 
and Origen’s definitions of his “typic” terms in exegetical contexts.
The standard allegory/typology construct presents, then, accounts of 
“allegory” and “typology” that diverge from, and sometimes even con-
tradict, Origen’s own definitions of éllhgor¤a and the “typic” terms. 
This discordance is, moreover, hardly innocuous since it is associated 
with several troubling ramifications. Perhaps most obvious, those who 
are unaware of these definitional discrepancies can easily be misled into 
imposing a different definition of “allegory” or “typology” onto Origen’s 
discussions of an éllhgor¤a or a tÊpow. Precisely because of the transpar-
ent linguistic relationship between “allegory” and éllhgor¤a, as well as 
between “typology” and the tÊpow family of terms, it is easy to see how 
someone could unsuspectingly foist any of the literature’s discrepant defini-
tions of “allegory” and “typology” back upon Origen’s discussions of an 
éllhgor¤a and a tÊpow. The reader’s reasonable expectation is that there 
should be definitional affinity where there is also linguistic affinity, but as 
I have argued above, there is usually not. There are instances where these 
divergent definitions have caused precisely this sort of confusion.96
to have taken place tupik«w ought to be understood and experienced pneumatik«w 
(“‘Typologie’ et ‘Allégorisme,’” 185). Also cf. R. Gögler, Zur Theologie des Bib-
lischen Wortes, 359–61.
96. Take the case of R. Heine’s rendering of the passage, already discussed above, 
from the Commentary on John. He translates the phrase, ˜low t«n tÊpvn ka‹ t«n 
svmatik«n �n, as: “because he belongs totally to the typological and literal level 
of understanding” (italics mine) (R. Heine, Origen, Commentary on the Gospel 
According to John, Books 13–32, FC, vol. 89 [Washington: CUA Press, 1993], 91). 
This translation goes amiss because Heine (reasonably) assumed that the linguistic 
affinity between Origen’s tÊpow and our “typological” equated to definitional affin-
ity. But this is precisely one of those passages, as I discussed above, where our pre-
vailing understanding of a “typological” interpretation contradicts Origen’s use of 
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Yet even for those who are aware of these definitional discrepancies, 
the conventional allegory/typology construct is still hardly convenient. 
Translators, for instance, must eschew some of the most convenient Eng-
lish terms that could serve as translations of éllhgor¤a and the tÊpow fam-
ily of terms, and in turn, come up with different English words that can 
capture Origen’s understandings of these Greek terms—as I have shown 
above, the newly-defined “allegory” and “typology” are no longer suit-
able terms for translating their Greek antecedents. The situation becomes 
especially cumbersome, however, since while the newly-defined “allegory” 
and “typology” cannot serve as definitions of éllhgor¤a and the tÊpow 
family of terms, they can be used to translate or describe other Greek 
terms and expressions. As I will demonstrate in the next section of this 
paper, Origen was clearly aware of the issue of successful and unsuccess-
ful nonliteral exegesis. As such, when Origen happens to speak of proper 
or improper nonliteral exegesis, those who embrace the allegory/typology 
dichotomy could argue that such passages should be described or even 
translated with the terms “allegory” and “typology.” But is it not mis-
leading to use “allegory” and “typology” in such circumstances if noth-
ing approaching éllhgor¤a or the tÊpow family of terms is found in the 
original passage? And is it not even more perplexing when Origen hap-
pens to discuss a successful nonliteral interpretation of an éllhgor¤a, or 
a particularly unsuccessful nonliteral exegesis of a tÊpow? How, namely, 
would scholars render those passages where Origen was referring to a par-
ticularly successful éllhgor¤a—would they decide to call this interpreta-
tion “typological” since this is the term that for us equates to “successful 
nonliteral exegesis”? Or conversely, will unpersuasive interpretations of 
tÊpoi be rendered, precisely because they are unsuccessful, “allegorical,” 
since this is the term that for us carries pejorative force? Because Origen 
can describe the nonliteral interpretations of both an éllhgor¤a and tÊpow 
as either successful or unsuccessful, the allegory/typology distinction can 
easily become an unwieldy construct for Origen’s students. 
tÊpow. Heine’s translation suggests that when Origen is talking about the reader who 
is engrossed in tÊpoi, Origen is talking about a nonliteral reader, since the phrase, 
“typological . . . level of understanding” consistently means “nonliteral understand-
ing” in modern biblical and theological parlance. In fact, however, Origen is saying 
precisely the opposite of what this English translation conveys: he is critiquing the 
reader for an unacceptable preoccupation with the literal and bodily meaning of fig-
ures. The only way “typological” can be used in this translation so that it does not 
mislead readers is if a note is supplied that explains how our prevailing definition of 
this adjective is precisely the opposite of what Origen meant by the interpreter of a 
tÊpow in this passage. 
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In sum, then, this first evaluation of the scholarship has shown that 
the literature defines the English terms that are derived from, transpar-
ently evoke, and often translate Origen’s exegetical vocabulary in ways 
that diverge, sometimes quite radically, from Origen’s definitions of his 
own vocabulary; this evaluation also spells out a series of inauspicious 
repercussions that attend the allegory/typology construct. At first glance, 
then, it appears that the critics of the allegory/typology distinction have 
it right.97 
EVIDENCE (PART II): ORIGEN’S CRITERIA
But do, in fact, the lexical problems as I have outlined them above warrant 
a complete dismissal of this distinction? I will contend in this section of the 
paper that they do not, since there is another facet of the allegory/typology 
distinction that turns out to have traction in Origen’s writings.
Even if Origen does not label successful and unsuccessful nonliteral 
interpretation with the “typic” family of terms and éllhgor¤a/éllhgor°v 
respectively, the question can still be asked: does he not, nevertheless, 
speak of proper and improper forms of nonliteral exegesis? In his brief 
response to H. de Lubac’s critique already cited above, J. Daniélou wrote 
that it was “convenient” to use typology and allegory as opposites: “The 
main thing, after all, is to make the distinction between the two things 
quite clear—which Fr. de Lubac does not, perhaps, altogether succeed in 
doing.”98 Daniélou articulated what, I think it is fair to say, is the leading 
concern of those who have insisted upon the allegory/typology distinction, 
the concern to demarcate clearly “the two things,” i.e., the unsuccessful 
from the successful nonliteral interpretations of Scripture. And so we need 
to ask: was Origen aware of the importance of the distinction between 
better and worse nonliteral interpretations of Scripture, and if so, where 
did he draw the dividing line? To the best of my knowledge, this question 
has not yet been put specifically to him.
Criteria
When we scan Origen’s corpus we do, in fact, detect guidelines by which 
he distinguished proper from improper nonliteral exegesis. I have been 
able to identify five of them. Origen can insist (1) upon the principle of 
similitude, that there be a likeness between the literal and nonliteral ref-
97. See n. 15 above.
98. Quoting from the ET (Origen [New York: Sheed and Ward, 1955], 327, n. 2). 
J. Daniélou, Origène (Paris: La Table Ronde, 1948), 175 n. 1. 
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erent. For example, in his On the Passover he remarks that there is, in 
fact, a significant dissimilarity between the Passover lamb sacrificed by the 
Hebrews and Christ’s passion: 
In the Scripture will be found many such things which, to those who read 
superficially, will seem to be identical, but which, to those who read with 
care and attention, will reveal their differences . . . . The lamb is sacrificed 
by the saints or Nazirites [cf. Num 6.12, 14], while the Savior is sacrificed 
by criminals and sinners.99 
The Passover sacrifice, in other words, cannot serve as a type of Christ’s 
passion since there is a significant dissimilarity between these two events—
holy figures (like Nazirites) sacrificed the Passover lamb, whereas criminals 
killed Christ. Yet why, Origen continues, does Paul write: “For Christ, 
our paschal lamb, is sacrificed” [1 Cor 5.7]? Paul seems to suggest that 
Christ’s passion is, in fact, the nonliteral referent of the Jewish Passover. 
But Origen proposes an alternative nonliteral referent of the Passover sac-
rifice that is both commensurate with Paul’s statement and faithful to the 
principle of similitude: “It is necessary for us to sacrifice the true lamb—if 
we have been ordained priests, or like priests have offered sacrifice—and 
it is necessary for us to cook and eat its flesh.”100 In other words, it is not 
Christ’s death, but rather the Christian priest’s spiritual sacrifice of Christ 
that is the true nonliteral referent of the Passover sacrifice. Origen is offer-
ing a nonliteral reading of the Jewish Passover that respects the criterion 
of similitude for successful, nonliteral exegesis.
There are additional guidelines for the nonliteral interpretation of Scrip-
ture to which I will refer more briefly. For instance, (2) such an interpreta-
tion must proceed in accordance with the ecclesiastical rule. Origen knows 
of the spiritual interpretation of the “heretics,” yet notes how “in this 
spiritual understanding they nevertheless do not hold to the apostolic rule 
of faith.”101 Another guideline (3) for discovering the nonliteral meaning 
of a passage is to attend to the etymological significance of a term. What 
99. Pascha 12 (B. Witte, Passa, 102.8–11, 17–19): Ka‹ deixyÆsetai pollå toiaËta 
[ka]tå tØn grafÆn, dokoË[nta] m¢n to›w par°rgvw é[nagi]n≈skousin tautÒth[ta ¶xei]n, 
to›w d¢ metÉ §pemele¤a[w k]a‹ §pistãsevw §ntugxã[no]usin épodeiknÊmena di[˙r]∞syai 
. . . . [TÚ m¢n] prÒba[t]on Íp[Ú èg¤]vn µ [Na]zira¤vn yÊ[etai,] ı d¢ svtØr ÍpÚ énÒmvn 
[ka‹ è]martvl«n yÊetai.
100. Pascha 13 (B. Witte, Passa, 102.24–26): ÑHmçw går de› yËsai tÚ é[lh]y¢w prÒ-
baton, §ån flerv[y«]men µ ‡son to›w flereËsin [pros]en°gkvmen, ka‹ ≤mç[w Ùpt]∞sai ka‹ 
≤mçw fage›n [tåw s]ãrkaw aÈtoË.
101. Hom 4.1 in Ps. 36 (SC 411:188.103–5): Si vero spiritaliter intellegant [haere-
tici], in ipso autem spiritali intellectu apostolicae non teneant regulam veritatis. Also 
cf. Princ. preface (GK 82:7.9); Princ. 4.2.1–2 (GK 694:305.25–700, 308.16).
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does it mean when it says that the “Word of the Lord” came to “Hosea 
the son of Beeri” [Hos 1.1]? Origen answers: “According to the histori-
cal sense, [the Word was sent] to the son of Beeri, the prophet Hosea. But 
according to the mystical sense, [this Word was sent] to the one who is 
saved—for ‘Hosea’ means ‘saved’ . . . .”102 Here the nonliteral (“mystical”) 
interpretation of Hosea 1.1 takes its cues from the etymological significance 
of “Hosea.”103 Many nonliteral interpretations of scriptural passages also 
take their cue (4) from other passages in Scripture—“interpreting Scrip-
ture with Scripture.”104 For example, Paschor strikes Jeremiah and throws 
him into the pit of the “upper area” (Jer 20.2), and so Origen wants to 
know what it would mean for him to be another Jeremiah, thrown into 
the “upper area” not of the temple but of Scripture. He then canvasses 
several references to an “upper area” in Scripture105 and concludes from 
these passages that it is “good to be in the upper areas.”106 Thus, Jeremiah 
being thrown into the “upper area” of the temple finds its nonliteral refer-
ent in Origen venturing into the “good” upper areas of Scripture, namely, 
ascending to the “lofty and exalted sense” of Scripture.107 Here discerning 
a pattern in the numerous references to “upper area” in Scripture helps 
Origen find a nonliteral interpretation of Jeremiah 20.2.108 Yet perhaps 
the most frequently mentioned guideline for nonliteral interpretation (5) 
is to follow the precedent of previous allegorical interpretations set by 
authoritative exegetes, Paul in particular. 
But it is a spiritual explanation when one is able to show of what kind 
of “heavenly things” the Jews “according to the flesh served as copy and 
shadow” [cf. Heb 8.5 and 1 Cor 10.18], and of what “future goods the law 
was a shadow” [cf. Heb 10.1]. And on the whole, we ought in all things 
102. Jo. 2.4 (GCS 4:52.18–53.1): katå m¢n tØn flstor¤an prÚw tÚn uflÚn toË Behre¤, 
profÆthn ÉVsh°, katå d¢ mustikÚn lÒgon prÚw tÚn svzÒmenon - ÉVsh¢ går •rmhneÊetai 
“SvzÒmenow.” Also cf. Hom. in Jer. 10.4.2 (SC 232:404.16).
103. See F. Wutz, Onomastica Sacra (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1914), 128.
104. This principle is often traced back by Origen to 1 Cor 2.13 (pneumatiko›w pneu-
matikå sugkr¤nontew): Hom. in Num. 16.9 (GCS 7:153.4); Philoc. 2.3 (SC 302:244.1–
17); Cels. 4.71 (SC 136:360.18–25); Comm. in Matt. 14.14 (GCS 10:315.13), etc. 
105. 1 Kgs 17.19, 2 Kgs 4.10, 2 Kgs 1.2, Matt 24.15–17, Acts 1.13, Acts 10.9, 
Acts 9.36–37, Matt 26.17 (Hom. in Jer. 19.13.2–4 [SC 238:226.23–228.53]).
106. Hom. in Jer. 19.13.3 (SC 238:228.33): KalÚn oÔn §n Íper–oiw e‰nai.
107. Hom. in Jer. 19.13.2 (SC 238:226.18–19): Íper“on d¢ tÚn noËn tÚn ÍchlÚn 
ka‹ §phrm°non de¤jv.
108. Other instances where this principle helps Origen allegorize include: Jo. 13.361 
(GCS 4:283.11–14); Comm. in Matt. 10.1 (GCS 10:2.3). Also without reference to 
1 Cor 2.13 this principle is called upon to steer an allegorical interpretation: cf. Hom. 
in Jer. 19.13.2 (SC 238:226.15).
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to search out, in accordance with the apostolic command, “the wisdom 
concealed in a mystery . . . .” [1 Cor 2.7–8]. Somewhere the same apostle 
also says, after referring to certain passages from Exodus and Numbers [cf. 
1 Cor 10.7–8], that “these things happened to them figuratively, and were 
written for us, upon whom the ends of the ages have come” [1 Cor 10.11]. 
He also gives resources [for determining] what these things were figures of, 
when he says: “For they drank of that spiritual rock that followed them, 
and that rock was Christ” [1 Cor 10.4].109 
Origen will repeatedly refer to the exegetical precedent set by Paul, and 
in his homilies on the OT will often incorporate this precedent into his 
own interpretations.110 
A Second Evaluation of the Literature
While probably not comprehensive, this list of guidelines is sufficient for 
the purposes of my argument. Origen, it is clear, did distinguish between 
better and worse forms of nonliteral exegesis, and this allows us to draw 
two important conclusions about the literature surveyed above. First, his 
awareness of the vicissitudes of nonliteral exegesis confirms that the con-
sensus literature has indeed gestured toward a legitimate Origenian con-
cern when it uses the terms “typology” and “allegory” to indicate proper 
and improper nonliteral exegesis respectively. This basic insight is accurate 
and best explains the resilience of the allegory/typology distinction in con-
temporary scholarship, despite its clear lexical deficiencies. 
Second, it is also clear that this consensus scholarship has only faintly 
echoed Origen’s own enunciated guidelines for how this distinction ought 
to be drawn. For instance, some of the proffered criteria surveyed above 
109. Princ. 4.2.6 (GK 714:315.15–716:316.9): PneumatikØ d¢ diÆghsiw t“ dunam°nƒ 
épode›jai, po¤vn “§pouran¤vn Ípode¤gmati ka‹ skiò” ofl “katå sãrka” ÉIouda›oi 
“§lãtreuon,” ka‹ t¤nvn “mellÒntvn égay«n ı nÒmow ¶xei skiãn.” ka‹ èpajapl«w 
§p‹ pãntvn katå tØn épostolikØn §paggel¤an zhtht°on “sof¤an §n musthr¤ƒ tØn 
épokekrumm°nhn, ∂n pro≈risen ı yeÚw prÚ t«n afi≈nvn efiw dÒjan t«n dika¤vn, ∂n oÈde‹w 
t«n érxÒntvn toË afi«now toÊtou ¶gnvke.” fhs‹ d° pou ı aÈtÚw épÒstolow, xrhsãmenÒw 
tisi =hto›w épÚ t∞w ÉEjÒdou ka‹ t«n ÉAriym«n, ˜ti “taËta tupik«w sun°bainen §ke¤noiw, 
§grãfh d¢ diÉ ≤mçw, efiw oÓw tå t°lh t«n afi≈nvn katÆnthke.” ka‹ éformåw d¤dvsi toË 
t¤nvn §ke›na tÊpoi §tÊgxanon, l°gvn: “¶pinon går §k pneumatik∞w ékolouyoÊshw p°traw, 
≤ d¢ p°tra ∑n ı XristÒw.”
110. Cf. Princ. 4.3.6 (GK 748:332.7); 4.3.8 (GK 752:334.4); Cels. 4.44 (SC 
136:298.44); repeatedly in the OT homilies, cf. Hom. in Gen. 3.4 (GCS 6:43.18); 
Hom. in Ex. 5.1 (GCS 6:184.2); Hom. in Lev. 7.4 (GCS 6:382.17); Hom. in Josh. 
3.1 (GCS 7:301.19); esp. Hom. in Josh. 5.2 (GCS 7:316.4), etc. Also cf. R. Gögler, 
Zur Theologie des Biblischen Wortes, 102–5, and F. Cocchini, Il Paolo di Origene: 
Contributo alla storia della recezione delle epistole paoline nel III secolo (Rome: 
Edizioni Studium, 1992), 137–48.
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are foreign to Origen. There is little, if any, indication that he drew a dis-
tinction between successful and unsuccessful nonliteral exegesis along 
the lines of whether texts or realities were being interpreted (Daniélou) 
or whether the nonliteral meanings were historical or timeless (Bienert). 
Some of the guidelines bring insufficient nuance to the discussion. When 
Young, for example, describes successful nonliteral exegesis (“ikonic 
mimesis”) as that which preserves and mirrors the ékolouy¤a of a pas-
sage, Origen would want immediately to qualify this—there are times 
when the nonliteral interpretation should respect the sequence of the pas-
sage, but there are also times when it should not, because this sequence 
has, in fact, been intentionally broken by the author.111 Some guidelines 
are offered as if they were foreign to Origen, though in fact they are not. 
Hanson speaks of similitude as a principle for typology (detecting a “simi-
lar situation” between the original event and its nonliteral referent) and 
proceeds to brand Origen largely as an allegorist who made no attempt 
to trace out similar situations—the implication is that Origen was igno-
rant of, or unconcerned with, this most rudimentary of criteria, though 
the evidence supplied above suggests that he was not. It is also striking 
how the literature has offered a reductive portrait of Origen, as many of 
his leading principles have simply been passed over in silence. Few have 
adequately stressed, for instance, that proper nonliteral meanings could 
emerge from a comparison of one passage of Scripture with another, or 
that they ought to adhere to the rule of faith.112 Nor has the scholarship 
sufficiently highlighted how authoritative the allegorical interpretations 
offered by Paul were for Origen.113 Finally, and perhaps most notable, 
there is the curious tendency in the literature to enumerate criteria for 
disciplined nonliteral exegesis without actually referring to Origen’s own 
discussions of the matter, which seems to insinuate, misleadingly, that our 
Alexandrian was unaware of this issue. 
111. For respecting a sequence, cf. esp. Hom. in Num. 27 where Origen contends 
that passing through the sequence of stages in the wilderness corresponds to the 
series of stages traversed in the spiritual life. For a scriptural author’s breaking of 
the sequence, cf. esp. Princ. 4.2.9 (GK 726:321.3); Jo.13.364–367 (GCS 4:283.33–
284.15); Jo. 32.11 (GCS 4:426.29).
112. Though see the important recent discussion of both of these criteria in J. J. 
O’Keefe and R. Reno, Sanctified Vision (for the principle of comparing one passage 
of Scripture with another, cf. 45–68, and for the role of the rule of faith in interpre-
tation, cf. 119–28). 
113. The notable exception here is H. de Lubac, History and Spirit: The Under-
standing of Scripture According to Origen, trans. by A. E. Nash and J. Merriell (San 
Francisco: Ignatius, 2007), 77–86.
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This second evaluation of the scholarship highlights its ambiguous 
value. While the literature correctly points out that Origen distinguished 
between better and worse forms of nonliteral exegesis, much of this lit-
erature has, at the same time, routinely failed to give a convincing por-
trait of what Origen himself thought constituted the guidelines for proper 
nonliteral exegesis. 
SUMMARY AND A WAY FORWARD
In this article I have attempted to bring clarity to the confusions that 
surround the contested issue of typological and allegorical exegesis in 
Origen. I have negotiated this tangled issue by drawing out two separate 
conversations. On the one hand, there are the terms that scholars have 
used (“typology” and “allegory”) to mark the distinction between better 
and worse forms of nonliteral exegesis; on the other hand, there is the dis-
tinction itself. When we keep these two conversations distinct, it becomes 
evident how the literature’s allegory/typology construct is of mixed value 
for our understanding of Origen’s exegesis.
On the one hand, the consensus literature’s discussions of allegory and 
typology point to a distinction that Origen himself voices, the concern 
to demarcate proper from improper nonliteral interpretation. This is an 
authentic, Origenian concern; Origen, it is clear, knew of this demarcation 
and on several occasions could articulate the guidelines that characterized 
successful nonliteral exegesis. At the same time, however, the consensus 
scholarship is decidedly less helpful, and even misleading, in the specific 
ways in which it distinguishes better from worse nonliteral exegesis for 
Origen—its distinctions seldom overlap neatly with his, and indeed, usually 
echo more clearly the criteria for successful nonliteral scriptural interpre-
tation that circulate in contemporary biblical and theological scholarship 
than they do Origen’s own criteria. As for the terms, most of the litera-
ture surveyed above failed to do justice to Origen’s own definitions of 
éllhgor¤a and the tÊpow family. While the scholarship takes over English 
terms that are derived from, echo, and often translate Origen’s exegetical 
vocabulary, it also defines these terms in non-Origenian ways. There are 
substantial ramifications to these definitional discrepancies, not the least 
of which is the tendency to mislead Origen’s readers into imposing diverg-
ing definitions onto his own terms. 
Given, then, the ambiguous character of the allegory/typology construct, 
how ought we to proceed not only for Origen, but also for the larger field 
of early Christian biblical scholarship, in such a way that the beneficial ele-
ment in the allegory/typology distinction is preserved, and its problematic 
316   JOURNAL OF EARLY CHRISTIAN STUDIES
elements are jettisoned? My proposal has three facets: first, that we dis-
continue using “typology” and “allegory” as labels for better and worse 
forms of nonliteral exegesis respectively; second, that we find alternative 
labels for these two forms of nonliteral interpretation; and third, that we 
develop a conversation around the criteria for successful nonliteral scrip-
tural interpretation. 
First, it would be helpful, certainly for Origen, to discontinue using the 
English terms “typology” and “allegory” as markers for better and worse 
forms of nonliteral scriptural interpretation respectively; there are numer-
ous difficulties that accompany such definitions of these terms. It remains 
to be determined if other early Christian readers of Scripture ever affili-
ated the Greek and Latin “typic” family of terms and éllhgor¤a/allegoria 
with successful and unsuccessful nonliteral exegesis. If they did, then there 
is no problem using “allegory” and “typology” in such a way for these 
readers. But if they did not, then the conclusion drawn here for Origen 
should apply to other early Christian interpreters of Scripture as well: we 
are better served not using “allegory and “typology” in that way. Ceasing 
to use “typology” and “allegory” as markers for better and worse nonlit-
eral exegesis, however, certainly does not mean that we stop using these 
terms; rather, it simply means that when we do draw upon these terms to 
describe ancient exegesis—terms that are derived from, evoke, and often 
translate ancient exegetical vocabulary—that we ought also to draw upon 
the ancients’ definitions of this vocabulary.
Ceasing to use “typology” and “allegory” as labels for proper and 
improper forms of nonliteral interpretation also does not mean that we 
suspend talking about these two sorts of nonliteral scriptural exegesis. 
Here enters the second facet of my proposal: that we ought to search for 
alternative labels for proper and improper nonliteral interpretation, labels 
that are more historically sensitive, or at the very least, not misleading. If 
a wider examination of Origen’s exegetical vocabulary, or that of other 
early Christian biblical scholars, should reveal other terms that did, in fact, 
serve as markers for better and worse forms of nonliteral exegesis, then 
these could certainly be used. But if, on the other hand, we cannot find 
any ancient labels for these two sorts of nonliteral exegesis, then we ought 
not to take over or evoke existing ancient terms with already-established 
meanings and compel them to serve as labels for better and worse forms 
of nonliteral exegesis. Rather, in such a case, since we are not obliged to 
use ancient terminology exclusively in our analyses of ancient biblical 
interpretation, we should freely develop our own terms and phrases that 
are independent of ancient terminology. 
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The final facet of my proposal advocates a more careful examination of 
how Origen and other early Christian scriptural scholars distinguished, 
both in theory and in practice, the successful and unsuccessful nonliteral 
interpretations of Scripture from one another. It is certainly the case that 
Origen was not alone among early Christian exegetes in working out 
guidelines for demarcating proper from improper nonliteral exegesis; it 
also stands to reason, moreover, that his criteria were not at every point 
the same as theirs. A significant chapter in the reconstruction of early 
Christian biblical interpretation could be devoted to a more historically 
informed account of how early Christian exegetes understood and prac-
ticed the distinction between better and worse forms of nonliteral scrip-
tural interpretation.
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